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WISDOM ACROSS THE ATLANTIC:
North America and the European Experience
by Paul Stanton KibeI

Human rights and environmental protection were among the most controversial issues discussed
during the national debate over ratification of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).l
Many of NAFTA's critics feared that the agreement would encourage NAFTA nations to attract and
retain investment by lowering the cost of doing business. 2 According to NAFTA's critics, this would
result in downward harmonization of worker and environmental standards, and a race to the bottom. To
lure investors, labor unions would be suppressed to keep wages down, worker safety standards would
be reduced, and environmental protection requirements would be relaxed or ignored. 3
Although NAFTA was ratified in December 1993, many of its critics' predictions have proven
true. In 1995, the Washington D.C. based Institute for Policy Studies (IPS) released a comprehensive
report entitled NAFTA's First Year. IPS reported that, since the agreement's adoption, there has been
a demonstrable decline in environmental protection and workers' rights in all ofNAFTA's countries,
including the United States. In the United States, perhaps the most visible sign of this decline has been
the recent Congressional effort to lower environmental standards to increase "international competitiveness." 4

The European experience
teaches one basic lesson. To
achieve just and sustainable
trade policies, international
regimes must possess the
authority to implement human
rights and environmental
measures.

As Canada, the United States, and Mexico confront the
human rights and environmental consequences ofNAFTA, they
might seek guidance from another regional trade regime - the
European Union (EU). As an older trade regime, the EU has
already encountered and attempted to resolve many of the
problems currently facing NAFTA. The European experience
teaches one basic lesson. To achieve just and sustainable trade
policies, international regimes must possess the authority to
implement human rights and environmental measures.5 Unfortunately, NAFTA now lacks this
.
authority.

NAFTA's Narrow Focus
In its present form, NAFTA is primarily an agreement, not a political institution. It is a document
that seeks to protect and promote the unregulated transnational trade of goods among Canada, the United
States, and Mexico. It does so by prohibiting certain types of trade restrictions, such as subsidies, import
tariffs, and quantitative import restrictions. 6 The institutions created to implement NAFTA, such as
dispute resolution panels, possess only negative powers. These tribunals can determine that a NAFTA
signatory is in violation of the agreement, but they cannot propose or adopt new international standards.7
Moreover, formal complaints can only be brought by national governments, not by private citizens or
non-governmental organizations. 8
NAFTA's side agreements on labor and the environment suffer similar and even more pronounced institutional weaknesses. Under the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation
(NAALC)9 and the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC),1O interna-
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tional commissions are established to determine whether NAFfA's signatory countries are suppressing
labor rights or lowering environmental standards to attract investment. Such actions are prohibited under
the tenus of the side agreements.
As with the NAFfA dispute panels, however, the NAALC and NAAEC commissions cannot
propose or adopt new international standards. Their power is limited to investigating alleged violations.
In some respects, these commissions are even weaker than NAFfA's panels. They are not even
empowered to directly impose penalties, issue injunctions or revoke free trade privileges when a
violation has been identified.!1
In short, NAFfA and its side agreements are all focused on one primary goal - to preserve
unregulated transnational trade. There are no institutions under NAFfA capable of moving proactively,
of creating new binding standards that could bring human rights and environmental concerns into the
regional economic planning process. The narrowness of the NAFTA regime has hindered the creation
of a just and sustainable trade policy in North America. Recent developments in Canada and Mexico
illustrate the regime's shortcomings.
In Canada, the temperate rainforests of British Columbia (B.C.) are being logged at an
environmentally unsustainable pace, degrading watersheds and destroying critical habitat for numerous
endangered species. 12 In the North American environmental community, there is widespread recognition that this logging is in violation of B.C:, federal Canadian and international environmentallaw.!3
B. C. unwillingness to enforce its own environmental laws, which lowers the Canadian timber industry's
business costs, is also placing pressure to lower
forest protection standards here in the U.S.
There are no institutions under NAFTA
capable of moving proactively, of
Current forest practices in British Columbia would
creating new binding standards that
appear to constitute a violation of both NAFfA and
could bring human rights and
the NAAEC. NAFfA states that it is inappropriate
environmental concerns into the
"to encourage investment by relaxing health, safety
regional economic planning process.
or environmental measures."14 NAAEC requires
that each country "effectively enforce its environmental laws and regulations." 15 While these guarantees sound good on paper, there are no institutions to effectively implement these provisions. Under
NAFfA and theNAAEC, the most environmentalists can do is request that aside agreement commission
undertake an investigation.
In Mexico, the 1994 Chiapas uprising illustrates the NAFfA regime' s impact on human rights. 16
For several decades, indigenous groups in Mexico have been struggling to maintain their communities
and traditional farming rights from encroachment by the Mexican national government. In 1982, the
Mexican government launched a program to modernize agriculture, and began leasing formerly
traditional farmland to the highest bidder. This often meant indigenous communities were displaced by
large multinational agribusiness operations. Indigenous efforts to organize themselves as legitimate
labor, humans rights, and political groups were routinely suppressed by the Mexican government.
On January 1, 1994, the same day that NAFfA went into effect, the Zapista Army of National
Liberation occupied several towns in Chiapas, Mexico. They issued a declaration calling NAFfA a
"death sentence for indigenous people." Although the Chiapas uprising was put down, many unan-
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swered questions remain.!7 Should U.S. business interests be a party to the Mexico's continuing
suppression oflabor and human rights? Should there be new North American institutions or provisions
to ensure that foreign investment does not lead to the extinction of indigenous cultures? The NAFTA
regime, with its focus on preserving free trade, is ill-equipped to ask, let alone answer, these questions.
Lessons From the European Experience

The European trade regime began with a limited economic mandate quite similar to that of
NAFrA. In 1957, the Treaty of Rome created the European Community (EC) to help reduce trade
barriers and encourage regional economic development.1 8 Unlike NAFrA, however, the Treaty of
Rome created more than a list of prohibitions. It created four new multinational political institutions:
the European Commission, the European Parliament, the European Council of Ministers, and the
European Court of Justice. Collectively, these institutions possessed the power not oply to determine
violations, but to adopt new all-European standards, called "regulations" or "directives". Under EC law,
regulations are directly enforceable as national law in EC nations. Directives set forth legal obligations,
but call upon EC nations to adopt their own implementing legislation.
Although the EC institutions initially focused on regulating trade and competition, they soon
expanded into other related areas. EC regulations and directives were adopted relating to the rights of
workers to organize politically, the labeling of hazardous substances, airpollution from industrial plants,
and drinking water quality. The EC's authority to adopt these regional standards was based on two
provisions in the Treaty of Rome: Article 100, which authorizes EC legislation that "directly affects the
establishment or functioning of the common market", and Article 235, which authorized actions
"necessary for a community objective."

In the area of labor and human rights, Europe has adopted several important measures. First, the
EC's 1989 Social Charter expressly provides workers the right of association to constitute professional
organizations or trade unions to defend their economic and social interests. 19 The Social Charter further
provides that every worker shall have the freedom to join - or not to join - such organizations without
the threat of any personal or occupational disadvantage. Second, the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms protects citizens' right to free speech and
assembly, and protects ethnic and religious minorities from discrimination by national governments. 20
These agreements are more than mere aspirational documents; they have been given teeth through
implementing directives and rulings by national and international courts.

In the environmental field, the 1987 Single European Act21 and the 1991 Maastricht Treaty22
expanded theEC' s law-making powers. These treaties also changed theEC to the European Union (EU).
Article 130 of the Single European Act established several new objectives for the EU, including "to
preserve, protect, and improve the quality of the environment" and to "contribute toward protecting
human health." The Maastricht Treaty provided the EU with additional powers to "ensure a prudent and
rational utilization of natural resources" and to "promote, at the international level, measures to deal with
regional or worldwide environmental problems." Moreover, in 1991 a European Environmental Agency
(headquartered in Copenhagen, Denmark) was established to collect information on environmental
protection, and to help monitor national compliance with EU directives and regulations.23
In addition to these integrative treaties, directives, and institutions, Europe has also created an
effective forum to enforce human rights and environmental guarantees - the European Court of Justice
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(ECl). Unlike the trade tribunals under NAFTA or the commissions under NAFTA' s side agreements,
the ECJ has jurisdiction over all disputes arising under EU law. 24 Moreover, the ECJ grants standing
not only to national governments, but to private citizens and non-governmental organizations as well. 25
The ECJ's broad jurisdiction and liberal standing have given teeth to the EU's human rights and
environmental provisions.

For instance, in the 1987 case UNECTEFv. Heylens, theECJ ruled that unreasonable restrictions
on a worker's right to relocate and change jobs violate EU law. 26 As another example, in the 1988 case
European Commission v. Denmark, theECJ held that national laws promoting environmental protection
are consistent with the EU's trade rules. 27
By expanding the types of issues it may regulate, and by creating institutions that enable the
creation of new human rights and environmental
standards, the ED has developed into something much
What is needed is a North American
more than a mere free trade agreement. From its
institution with the broad objectives
initial inception in 1957 as a vehicle to promote
and legislative powers of the
unregulated transnational trade, the ED has matured
European Union - perhaps a North
into a comprehensive multinational institution. It
American Union (NAU).
now has the power and means to integrate humans
rights and environmental protection in Europe' s larger
economic framework. 28

The Quest for Just and Sustainable Trade in North America
To deal with the human rights and environmental protection issues raised by transnational trade,
Canada, the United States, and Mexico need to develop an integrated, comprehensive framework. The
foundation of this framework should not be an unyielding adherence to regional free trade. Rather, it
should be the principle of just and sustainable economic development. Because of its narrow free trade
focus and its institutional weaknesses, the NAFTA regime currently cannot provide this framework.
What is needed is a North American institution with the broad objectives and legislative powers
of the European Union - perhaps a North American Union (NAU). In the context of an NAU, NAFTA
would not be the regional "constitution" upon which all future efforts must comply. Rather, NAFTA
would simply be one aspect, one legislative component, of the NAU's larger mandate. Under an NAD
type framework, treaties like the NAALC and the NAAEC would possess the same authority as NAFTA,
and would not be treated as subordinate or side agreements. Moreover, the new regime would provide
an effective political forum for addressing other non-free trade issues, and for proposing new regional
initiatives.
The creation of an NAU with broad powers cannot happen overnight. As the evolution of the
European Union demonstrates, nations are understandably reluctant to delegate law-making authority
to untested international institutions. 29 This delegation or sharing of legal authority is often viewed as
a threat to national sovereignty. However, if international institutions are responsive to the needs of
citizens, and if they lead to more just and sustainable policies, this national reluctance can be overcome.
For North America, the first step is to move beyond the narrowness ofNAFTA, and to lay the foundation
for a more comprehensive and democratic regional regime.

May 1996

Environs

73

Canada, the United States, and Mexico should learn from Europe' s experience. As the European
Court of Justice declared in the 1985 case Procureur de la Republique v. ADBHU, "the principle of
freedom of trade is not to be viewed in absolute terms but is subject to certain limits justified by the
objectives of general interest pursued by the Community."30
The creation of a new North American institution with a
similar broad mandate is the best means to ensure that human
rights and environmental protection are part of the region's For North America, the first step
is to move beyond the
development agenda.
About the Author: Paul Kibei is a staff attorney for the
Pacific Environment and Resources Center, and international advocacy and policy group based in San Francisco.
He received his B.A.from Colgate University in 1989, and
his J.D. from Willamette University in 1993.

narrowness ofNAFTA, and to
lay the foundation for a more
comprehensive and democratic
regional regime.
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